Wednesday, October 31, 2012

1996 Global Business Proceedings


This posting shows similarities in the wording of the following publication by Douglas Agbetsiafa and the works of other, earlier published authors:
                                                                                           
Agbetsiafa, Douglas K., "Distributed Lag Effects of Fiscal Deficits On Short-Term and Long-Term Interest Rates", Proceedings, Global Business. (November 1996): 318-324.


Douglas Agbetsiafa is Professor of Economics and Chair of the Economics Area at Indiana University South Bend (IUSB).  He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Notre Dame.  That PhD also contains wording that is similar to earlier published authors.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 318:

The growth of fiscal deficits and the resulting increase in government debt have attracted the attention of policy makers and financial market analysts. Theoretical affects of borrowed deficits are wide ranging and substantial. A very strong hypothesis: predictable changes in government debt do not affect any other variable in the economy. As a first approximation, suppose that changes in government debt do not affect private wealth if agents forecast the implied substitution of future taxes for current taxes as in some of Barro's models (1974). Faster growth of real debt will not increase the growth the growth of spending or the inflation rate because agents do not perceive any improvement in their situation when they hold more debt. Instead, debt supply is accompanied by increased private demand for debt; as a result, there is no effect on interest rates if greater debt is issued to the public.

Compare this to:

.. very strong hypothesis: predictable changes in government debt do not affect any other variable in the economy. As a first approximation, suppose that changes in government debt do not affect private wealth if agents forecast the implied substitution of future taxes for current taxes as in some of Barro's models (1974) . Faster growth of real debt will not increase the growth of spending or the inflation rate because agents do not perceive any improvement in their situation when they hold more debt. Increased debt supply is accompanied by increased private demand for debt; as a result, there is no effect on interest rates of greater debt issued to the public.
Gerald Dwyer (1982) Inflation and Government Deficits. Economic Inquiry, 20(3): 315-329. [Page 320]

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 318:

Rational behavior by the central bank implies that debt issued to the public has no effect on the central bank behavior. If the amount of privately held debt is a matter of indifference to private agents, then presumably any changes in that debt do not generate costs or benefits to the monetary authorities for different behavior. As a result, if government debt is not net wealth and the political process reflects this without misconceptions. Then there is no reason to expect the central bank purchases to reflect interest rate effects that are nonexistent. This does not necessarily deny that the central banks may engage in even-keeling operations and stabilize interest rates as bonds issued and distributed in the economy.

Compare this to:

"Rational" behavior by the Federal Reserve implies that debt issued to the public has no affect on the Federal Reserve's behavior. If the amount of privately-held debt is a matter of indifference to private agents, the presumably any changes in that debt do not generate costs or benefits to the Federal Reserve for different behavior. As a result, if government debt is not net wealth and the political process reflects this without misconceptions, then there is no reason to expect Federal Reserve purchases to reflect interest-rate effects that are nonexistent. This does not necessarily deny that the Federal Reserve may engage in even-keeling operations and stabilize interest rates as bonds are issued and distributed in the economy.
Gerald Dwyer (1982) Inflation and Government Deficits. Economic Inquiry, 20(3): 315-329. [Page 320]

From Agbetsiafa publication, page #:

This imbalance forces nominal interest rates to rise. On the other hand, the Ricardian hypothesis argues that neither consumption nor interest rates arc affected by the stock of government debt or by the deficit. In an extensive survey, Seater (1993) concludes.that the Ricardian equivalence is approximately consistent with the data.

Compare this to:

This result is consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis that neither consumption nor interest rates are affected by the stock of government debt or by the deficit. In an extensive survey, Seater (1993) also concludes that the Ricardian hypothesis is approximately consistent with the data.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 319:

Attempts to use quarterly data to capture the effects of fiscal deficits on interest rates have been plagued by anomalies. First, there exists theoretically surprising results such as larger deficits causing lower interest rates (Plosser 1982; Evans 1985, 1986, 1987a and b; and U.S. Treasure Department 1984).  Secondly, there is a lack of clarity as to how deficits should be defined (Eiser 1986, 1989a, b and c; Gramlich 1989). Finally, there is the problem of parameter instability in the models used (Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamessetti 1990). 

Compare this to:

ATTEMPTS TO USE QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL DATA to capture the effect of deficits on interest rates have been plagued by a number of anomalies. First, and most importantly, there exists theoretically surprising results such as larger deficits causing lower interest rates (Plosser 1982; Evans 1985, I9S6. 1987a and b; and U.S. Treasury Department 1984). Secondly, there is a lack of clarity as to how deficits should be defined (Eisner 1986, 1989a-b and c; Gramlich 1989), Finally, there is the problem of parameter instability in the models used (Swamy, Kolluri. and Singamsetti 1990).
Michael Regan Quigley & Susan Porter-Hudak (1994) “A new approach in analyzing the effect of deficit announcements on interest rates”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26(4): 894-902 [See start of very first paragraph on page 894]



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