Wednesday, October 31, 2012

1996 Global Business Proceedings


This posting shows similarities in the wording of the following publication by Douglas Agbetsiafa and the works of other, earlier published authors:
                                                                                           
Agbetsiafa, Douglas K., "Distributed Lag Effects of Fiscal Deficits On Short-Term and Long-Term Interest Rates", Proceedings, Global Business. (November 1996): 318-324.


Douglas Agbetsiafa is Professor of Economics and Chair of the Economics Area at Indiana University South Bend (IUSB).  He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Notre Dame.  That PhD also contains wording that is similar to earlier published authors.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 318:

The growth of fiscal deficits and the resulting increase in government debt have attracted the attention of policy makers and financial market analysts. Theoretical affects of borrowed deficits are wide ranging and substantial. A very strong hypothesis: predictable changes in government debt do not affect any other variable in the economy. As a first approximation, suppose that changes in government debt do not affect private wealth if agents forecast the implied substitution of future taxes for current taxes as in some of Barro's models (1974). Faster growth of real debt will not increase the growth the growth of spending or the inflation rate because agents do not perceive any improvement in their situation when they hold more debt. Instead, debt supply is accompanied by increased private demand for debt; as a result, there is no effect on interest rates if greater debt is issued to the public.

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.. very strong hypothesis: predictable changes in government debt do not affect any other variable in the economy. As a first approximation, suppose that changes in government debt do not affect private wealth if agents forecast the implied substitution of future taxes for current taxes as in some of Barro's models (1974) . Faster growth of real debt will not increase the growth of spending or the inflation rate because agents do not perceive any improvement in their situation when they hold more debt. Increased debt supply is accompanied by increased private demand for debt; as a result, there is no effect on interest rates of greater debt issued to the public.
Gerald Dwyer (1982) Inflation and Government Deficits. Economic Inquiry, 20(3): 315-329. [Page 320]

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 318:

Rational behavior by the central bank implies that debt issued to the public has no effect on the central bank behavior. If the amount of privately held debt is a matter of indifference to private agents, then presumably any changes in that debt do not generate costs or benefits to the monetary authorities for different behavior. As a result, if government debt is not net wealth and the political process reflects this without misconceptions. Then there is no reason to expect the central bank purchases to reflect interest rate effects that are nonexistent. This does not necessarily deny that the central banks may engage in even-keeling operations and stabilize interest rates as bonds issued and distributed in the economy.

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"Rational" behavior by the Federal Reserve implies that debt issued to the public has no affect on the Federal Reserve's behavior. If the amount of privately-held debt is a matter of indifference to private agents, the presumably any changes in that debt do not generate costs or benefits to the Federal Reserve for different behavior. As a result, if government debt is not net wealth and the political process reflects this without misconceptions, then there is no reason to expect Federal Reserve purchases to reflect interest-rate effects that are nonexistent. This does not necessarily deny that the Federal Reserve may engage in even-keeling operations and stabilize interest rates as bonds are issued and distributed in the economy.
Gerald Dwyer (1982) Inflation and Government Deficits. Economic Inquiry, 20(3): 315-329. [Page 320]

From Agbetsiafa publication, page #:

This imbalance forces nominal interest rates to rise. On the other hand, the Ricardian hypothesis argues that neither consumption nor interest rates arc affected by the stock of government debt or by the deficit. In an extensive survey, Seater (1993) concludes.that the Ricardian equivalence is approximately consistent with the data.

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This result is consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis that neither consumption nor interest rates are affected by the stock of government debt or by the deficit. In an extensive survey, Seater (1993) also concludes that the Ricardian hypothesis is approximately consistent with the data.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 319:

Attempts to use quarterly data to capture the effects of fiscal deficits on interest rates have been plagued by anomalies. First, there exists theoretically surprising results such as larger deficits causing lower interest rates (Plosser 1982; Evans 1985, 1986, 1987a and b; and U.S. Treasure Department 1984).  Secondly, there is a lack of clarity as to how deficits should be defined (Eiser 1986, 1989a, b and c; Gramlich 1989). Finally, there is the problem of parameter instability in the models used (Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamessetti 1990). 

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ATTEMPTS TO USE QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL DATA to capture the effect of deficits on interest rates have been plagued by a number of anomalies. First, and most importantly, there exists theoretically surprising results such as larger deficits causing lower interest rates (Plosser 1982; Evans 1985, I9S6. 1987a and b; and U.S. Treasury Department 1984). Secondly, there is a lack of clarity as to how deficits should be defined (Eisner 1986, 1989a-b and c; Gramlich 1989), Finally, there is the problem of parameter instability in the models used (Swamy, Kolluri. and Singamsetti 1990).
Michael Regan Quigley & Susan Porter-Hudak (1994) “A new approach in analyzing the effect of deficit announcements on interest rates”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26(4): 894-902 [See start of very first paragraph on page 894]



1995 Proceedings of the Academy of Business Administration


This posting shows similar wording in the following publication by Douglas Abetsiafa and the works of other, earlier published authors:

Agbetsiafa. Douglas K., "Growth Implications of Financial Intermediation Under Information Asymmetry", Trends in Modern Business, Proceedings of the Academy of Business Administration. (February 1995): 459-467.

Douglas Agbetsiafa is Professor of Economics and Chair of the Economics Area at Indiana University South Bend (IUSB).  He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Notre Dame.  That PhD also contains wording that is similar to earlier published authors.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:              

Other studies on the macroeconomic implications of financial intermediation incorporate many of the earlier ideas of Gurley-Shaw and others, and stress the role of these institutions in overcoming imperfections in markets which transfer funds between savers and investors.

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Current research on the macroeconomic implications of financial intermediation incorporates many of the earlier ideas of Gurley and Shaw and others. It stresses the role of these institutions in overcoming imperfections in markets which transfer funds between savers and investors.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:

Diamond (1984) provides an early example of how it is possible to formally explain intermediary-like institutions. He considers a setting with an information structure similar to Townsend (1978) costly state verification model, in which lenders cannot freely observe the returns to borrowers's [sic] projects.

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Diamond (1984) provides an early example of how it is possible to formally explain intermediary-like institutions. He considers a setting with an information structure similar to the one in Townsend's costly state verification model: lenders cannot freely observe the returns to borrowers' projects.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:

As with Townsend, the optimal bilateral financial arrangement is a risky debt contract under which the lender monitors the borrower in the event of default.

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As with Town- send, the optimal bilateral financial arrangement is a risky debt contract, under which the lender monitors the borrower in the event of default

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:

Diamond then shows that, in order w economize on monitoring costs, it is optimal for a competitive financial institution to channel funds between savers and borrowers. Furthermore, the structure of the financial intermediaries which arise endogenously, do share basic features of a conventional financial intermediary.

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Diamond then proves that, in order to economize on monitoring costs, it is optimal for a competitive financial institution to channel funds between savers and borrowers. Further, the structure of this institution-which arises endogenously-shares basic features of a conventional intermediary.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:   

They write loan contracts with individual borrowers, and monitor borrowers who default; hold a diversified portfolio; and transform assets for savers. Diamond goes on to show that the latter two characteristics arise to solve a potential incentive problem between the financial institutions and their depositors.

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… loan contracts with individual borrowers and monitors borrowers who default; (ii) holds a heavily diversified portfolio; (iii) transforms assets for savers-in …Diamond shows that the latter two characteristics arise to solve a potential incentive problem between the financial institution and its depositors.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:               

Williamson (1986) uses a similar environment to illustrate how intermediation and credit rationing may be interrelated phenomenon. Rationing emerges in his framework because costly state verification adds a premium to loan rates, intermediation arises simultaneously as a way to minimize this premium, and thus, minimize rationing by economizing on monitoring costs.

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For example, Williamson (1986) uses a similar environment to illustrate how intermediation and credit rationing may be inter- related phenomena. Rationing emerges in his framework because costly state verification adds a premium to loan rates (see the previous section); intermediation arises simultaneously as way to minimize this premium-and thus minimize rationing-by economizing on monitoring costs, in analogy to Diamond's argument.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:  

One striking feature of the behavioral theories presented thus far, is that intermediation works well, in fact so well. that taking the models literally, a laissez-faire policy toward financial intermediaries is optimal.

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One striking feature of the behavioral theories presented thus far is that inter- mediation works extremely well, so well that-taking the models literally-a laissez-faire policy toward financial intermediaries is optimal.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:     

On the other hand, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) make a case for government intervention to insure smooth flow of liquidity without appealing to arbitrary restrictions on private contracts. Implicit assumption of their paper is that any case for government credit market intervention, probably rests on the absence of well functioning secondary markets for the assets of the relevant financial institutions.

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… Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) make a case for government intervention to insure the smooth flow of liquidity, without appealing to arbitrary restrictions on private contracts. … Any case for government intervention into particular forms of intermediation probably rests on the absence of well-functioning secondary markets for the assets of the relevant financial institutions.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:

But Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) have questioned the extent of exploitation, suggesting instead, that the high rates are a result of the high rates of default, high cost of screening loan applicants and of pursuing delinquent borrowers. Because of the importance of local information, moneylenders' loans are generally concentrated within a narrow geographic area. The inability to diversify means that the risks they bear are higher, and the lending market carries high risk premia. Thus, both in the rates charged and the institutional arrangements by which loans are extended, traditional moneylending differs markedly from conventional banking institutions.

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More recent views have questioned the extent of exploitation, suggesting that the high rates are a result of three factors: the high rates of default, the high correlations among defaults, and the high cost of screening loan applicants and pursuing delinquent borrowers.' Because of the importance of local information, moneylenders' loans are generally concentrated within a single geographical area; the inability to diversify means that the risks they must bear are large.
Both in the rates charged and the institutional arrangements by which loans are extended, traditional moneylending appears markedly different from modern banking institutions of the form found in more developed economies.

From Agbetsiafa publication, page 460:   

The policy response arising from the exploitative view of moneylenders was to provide subsidized institutional credit as an alternative to the moneylender.

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The policy response arising from this explanation of high interest rates was clear-it was to provide cheap institutional credit as an alternative to the moneylender.
Taken from:

From Agbetsiafa, page 460-461:

Many governments, supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, have devoted considerable resources to supplying credit in a myriad of institutional settings. This intervention which has taken various forms including outright government ownership of financial institutions; the setting up of specific institutions (development

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Many governments, supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings.
Word for word from:


From Agbetsiafa publication, page 461:      

The local moneylenders have an important advantage over conventional financial institutions in that they have detailed knowledge of borrowers, can separate out high and low-risk borrowers and charge them appropriate interest rates, and are able to monitor borrowers more effectively.

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But another part of the reason may be that the local moneylenders have one important advantage over the formal institutions: they have more detailed knowledge of the borrowers. They therefore can separate out high-risk and low-risk borrowers and charge them appropriate interest rates; …